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Introduction
By EDmuND G. BROWN, SR.*
I am proud to have had the privilege of appointing Mathew
Tobriner to the Supreme Court of the State of California. He is
an outstanding justice, but, more than that, Mathew Tobriner is a
rare and fine human being.
Mathew Tobriner has had a profound influence upon my life.
His timely advice many years ago led to my becoming governor of
this state. This statement may seem to be an exaggeration, but a
glance at the early days of two young lawyers will confirm it.
When Matt Tobriner and I were new attorneys, we had our offices
on the same floor of the Russ Building in San Francisco, where we
frequently met in the halls. The incident that had a profound influence upon my future resulted from such a meeting one day in 1934.
Franklin D. Roosevelt had been president for two years, and although
both Matt and I were Republicans, we were very much impressed with
Roosevelt's New Deal and particularly with his fireside chats. On this
day Matt told me that he was changing his registration from Republican to Democrat. He said, "From my many talks with you, I think
you have to do the same thing." I responded, "Changing your politics
is like changing your religion." His response was the catalyst for my
weighing my own convictions about the role of government: "If you
no longer believe in your religion, don't you think you should change?"
I weighed the implications of his remarks and then said, "Let's go
together to the registrar's office." We did just that. We changed
our registration and became members of the Democratic Party. As
I look back on my life and my successes and failures in politics, I
am confident I never would have been the nominee for either attorney general or governor if I had continued to be a member of the
Republican Party.
When I became governor and had the task of filling vacancies in
the judicial branch, I sought to appoint great lawyers - the best legal
minds this nation had to offer. Although Matt Tobriner did not seek
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appointment, I regarded him as eminently qualified. One day he and
his wife made a visit to the Executive Mansion. Just before he left
I said to him, "Matt, how would you like to be a justice of the court
of appeal?" I will never forget the surprised look on his face which
preceded his promise to think it over. The next day Matt telephoned
me and said that he would be very happy to accept. Soon thereafter
I appointed him an associate justice of the court of appeal. Two years
later I elevated him to the Supreme Court of the State of California.
Mathew Tobriner proved to be an excellent choice for the judiciary. He has displayed in his work the brilliance, courage, and compassion of an extraordinary human being. Throughout his judicial
writings two broad jurisprudential themes have appeared repeatedly.
First, Justice Tobriner is above all a social realist. His opinions have
invariably reflected his belief that legal doctrines are not platonic
ideals to be pursued for their own sake but rather are practical guides
to govern relationships and resolve disputes in the real world. As a
consequence, one of his prime concerns has been that legal doctrines
reflect contemporary social realities and that judicial doctrines which
were developed in an earlier era be reexamined in light of their presentday operation. The second principal thesis in Justice Tobriner's works,
closely related to his concern with social reality, has been a recognition
of the important role that law and legal doctrine must play in preserving the dignity and importance of the individual as he seeks to survive
and develop in a society where decisions that affect the basic aspects
of a person's life are made increasingly by large, remote, and often
impersonal institutions, both governmental and private.A review of
just a few of Justice Tobriner's numerous opinions illustrates how these
two themes have influenced his work.
In Gray v. Zurich,' for example, Justice Tobriner explained that
in interpreting the meaning and coverage of an insurance contract,
courts should look beyond the "fine print" of the contract and construe
the document in light of the reasonable expectations of the individual
who had purchased the insurance. Justice Tobriner wrote:
[A] contract entered into between two parties of unequal bargaining strength, expressed in the language of a standardized contract,
written by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs,
and offered to the weaker party on a "take it or leave it" basis
carries some consequences that extend beyond orthodox implications. Obligations arising from such a contract inure not alone
from the consensual transaction but from the relationship of the
parties.2
1.
2.

65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
Id. at 269, 419 P.2d at 171, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
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Gray thus recognized that the emergence of a new kind of contractual
relationship, founded upon a standardized, adhesion contract, necessitated a modification of traditional doctrines of contract interpretation
if the rights and legitimate expectations of individuals were to be
preserved.
In modern society, however, it is not only large private institutions,
such as insurance companies, which have the power, if left unchecked
by legal doctrine, to overwhelm the individual citizen. In Bixby v.
Pierno,3 Justice Tobriner recognized that the individual may be equally powerless when confronted by large governmental bureaucracy.
Courts must exercise an independent check on administrative actions
when they affect "vested fundamental rights" if those rights of the individual are to be preserved from arbitrary or discriminatory action.
Justice Tobriner's opinion in People v. Dorado,4 which presaged
the United States Supreme Court's renowned decision in Miranda v.
Arizona,5 illustrates the same general concern for the protection of the
individual in the context of a criminal proceeding. Prior to Dorado,
the United States Supreme Court had held that, upon request, a defendant in custody was entitled to have counsel present during any
police interrogation. In Dorado, the state argued that the right to
have counsel present during police interrogation was only applicable
when the defendant initiated the request for the counsel's presence.
The California Supreme Court, through Justice Tobriner, rejected this
contention. The court emphasized that such a rule would unfairly
discriminate against the average, unsophisticated defendants who do
not know their rights and who most need counsel., These two themes
have also appeared in Justice Tobriner's opinions in the civil realm.
His opinion in Dillon v. Legg7 stands as an outstanding example of
his conviction that legal doctrines must be viewed in historical perspective and should be constantly reexamined to assure that their
operation continues to serve contemporary societal values. In Dillon,
Justice Tobriner undertook a review of the tort concept of "duty," a
concept that throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had been viewed as a prerequisite to the recovery of damages
by an injured party. Dillon rejected the myth that the concept of duty
was "an old and deep-rooted doctrine" and noted instead that the duty
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971).
62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
62 Cal. 2d at 351, 398 P.2d at 369-70, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78.
68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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concept was simply "a legal device of the latter half of the nineteenth
century designed to curtail the feared propensities of juries toward
liberal awards."8 As a consequence the court concluded that the recovery or denial of damages is governed by whether the defendant
owes a duty to the plaintiff as determined not by whether past cases
had found that the defendant owed a "duty of care" to such plaintiffs.
Rather recovery or denial of damages is governed by whether the plaintiff's injury was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's
conduct and whether any current public policy required the denial
of recovery.9
Justice Tobriner's recent opinion in Marvin v. Marvin ° vividly
demonstrates that he remains committed to a legal system that is
sensitive to contemporary social realities. In Marvin, the supreme
court refused to invalidate a contractual property agreement entered
into by a nonmarried couple and held instead that such couples enjoy
the same contractual rights as other individuals and could expressly
or impliedly agree to share earnings or other property accumulated
during their relationship.
Justice Tobriner has held fast to this commitment even when to
do so separated him from the remainder of the justices, as occurred
in Bakke v. Regents of the University of California," a six to one
decision. The majority in Bakke held that a state university medical
school's special admissions program which in effect favored minority
applicants violated the rights guaranteed to the majority by the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution. This result was
based on a finding that the admissions criteria used had the effect of
denying admission to some white applicants solely because of their
race1 2 and on a determination that the strictest standard of scrutiny
applies to a racial classification whether the group suffering the discrimination is the majority or the minority.' 3
In his dissent, Justice Tobriner stressed the practical need to integrate the medical profession and deplored the blow which the majority
had delivered to voluntary efforts by schools to achieve this result.
He refused to accept the characterization of a racial classification
designed as a remedy for the real problem of currently segregated
8. Id. at 734, 441 P.2d at 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
9. Id,
10. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
11. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97
S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
12. Id. at 47-48, 553 P.2d at 1161-62, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90.
13. Id. at 50, 553 P.2d at 1163, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
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institutions as "invidious." Instead, he designed a standard of scrutiny
with which to measure a benign racial classification, based upon a
realistic analysis of its true purpose and effect.14 Further, he was
willing to face and accept the fact that some measure of detriment to
some majority individuals would be the inevitable result in many
circumstances of a remedy to the very real present effects of past
discrimination against minorities and rejected as an illogical barrier
the view that an institution seeking to remedy those effects must have
itself practiced discrimination in the past. 15 He concluded that the
medical school's special admissions program survived the proposed
standard of scrutiny and was an entirely appropriate measure to
promote integration of the medical profession.' 6
Justice Tobriner has played a most important role in developing
the fine and well deserved reputation of the Supreme Court of California. This court has been a leader in protecting individual rights
and developing legal doctrines to fit the needs of modem society.
In these pursuits Justice Tobriner has always been a leader on the
court. He greatly deserves the honor that has been bestowed upon
him by the dedication of this issue of the Hastings Law Journalto his
contributions to the law.
14. Id. at 81-92, 553 P.2d at 1184-91, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712-19.
15. Id. at 73-76, 553 P.2d at 1179-81, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 707-09.
16. Id. at 81-87, 553 P.2d at 1184-89, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 712-17.

